![]() Yes, I think what we have lost is a distinctive way of thinking about science. Many scientists in the early 20th century were deeply engaged with philosophy, including Einstein, Bohr, Mach and Born. The philosopher of science who explores Bayesian methods in cosmology, or who scrutinizes assumptions behind simplified models in high-energy physics, is no different from the archaeologist, the historian or the anthropologist in producing knowledge that is useful for us as humankind. It is part of our cultural heritage and scientific history. And we owe this intellectual investigation to humankind. We engage with the theoretical foundations of science and its conceptual nuances. We scrutinize scientific methodologies and modeling practices. We philosophers build narratives about science. ![]() What use, then, is philosophy of science if not for scientists themselves? I see the target beneficiary as humankind, broadly speaking. Why should philosophy of science be any different? The same for archaeology and anthropology. We would not assess the intellectual value of Roman history in terms of how useful it might be to the Romans themselves. How do you defend it?ĭismissive claims by famous physicists that philosophy is either a useless intellectual exercise, or not on a par with physics because of being incapable of progress, seem to start from the false assumption that philosophy has to be of use for scientists or is of no use at all.īut all that matters is that it be of some use. Richard Feynman is often quoted as saying that the philosophy of science is of much use to scientists as ornithology is to birds. An edited and condensed version of the interview follows. Quanta caught up with Massimi as she prepared to deliver her prize lecture. Massimi, Italian-born and currently based at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, comes down on the side of the realists, and argues, in a position she calls “perspectival realism,” that science can make progress - a much-contested word in philosophy - despite being inevitably shaped by social and historical factors. Her work asks whether the process of science approaches a singular, true conception of the world, or whether it is content with simply describing physical phenomena, ignoring any sense of whether the stories it tells about the world are true. In addition to serving as a defender of the value of science, Massimi investigates issues surrounding “realism” and “anti-realism”: how, if at all, science relates to an objective reality. She argues that neither enterprise should be judged in purely utilitarian terms, and asserts that they should be allies in making the case for the social and intellectual value of the open-ended exploration of the physical world. Massimi’s prize speech, delivered earlier this week, defended both science and the philosophy of science from accusations of irrelevance. ![]() That value is asserted with gentle but firm assurance by Michela Massimi, the recent recipient of the Wilkins-Bernal-Medawar Medal, an award given annually by the U.K.’s Royal Society. On the other hand, some physicists, such as Richard Feynman and Stephen Hawking, were notoriously dismissive of the value of the philosophy of science. On the one hand, some scientists working on ideas such as string theory or the multiverse - ideas that reach far beyond our current means to test them - are forced to make a philosophical defense of research that can’t rely on traditional hypothesis testing. ![]() It’s an interesting time to be making a case for philosophy in science. ![]()
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